

Review of
**INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS**

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Review of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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A FORTNIGHT IN THE WORLD

UNITED NATIONS STARTING WORK

In a few day's time, on September 21, the United Nations General Assembly will begin its ninth regular session, to discuss a number of important and urgent matters. This year the Assembly will have to devote much of its time to the problem of Korea, the solving of which made no progress either at Geneva or at the earlier Political Conference, which had been asked by the United Nations to find a solution to the Far Eastern deadlock. The question of China's admission to the United Nations may also be raised, since an increasing number of countries find it difficult to support the present unnatural situation, in which the Chiang Kai Shek Government appears on behalf of a country whose people have long rejected it. It is likewise possible that the problem of Formosa will be brought before the General Assembly in one form or another, for there are many responsible people who maintain that, owing to the open American control over that part of the Chinese national territory, and to the dangerous actions Chiang Kai Shek is at present taking against the Chinese mainland, it may become a joint formula which would make a last year's session the General Assembly asked the Disarmament Commission to continue work for an agreement in its field of action, and the Great Powers were requested to try and find a joint formula which would make a reduction in armaments possible. But owing largely to the unyielding attitude of the Soviet Union and, to some extent, to the inflexibility of American policy, the Great Powers have found no such formula. The French delegation, with some support from the British, has, however, come forward with some new elements which may give an entirely different aspect to the whole problem at this year's session. The report to be submitted by the Disarmament Commission on the basis of the French proposals will afford an excellent opportunity for discussion, and the fact that the French delegation is to be headed by M. Mendes France himself is an indication that France intends to continue taking the initiative, for both general and personal reasons.

It is probable that this year the General Assembly will come to a final decision on the establishment of the proposed fund for the economic development of backward areas for, dur-

ing the last few years, when international tension has been relaxing, many countries have come to regard this fund as the best instrument for assisting the underdeveloped regions to overcome their difficulties, as well as a path which would lead to better cooperation among peoples, and so eliminate the various sources of friction and conflict in the world.

With the first signs that the danger of war was decreasing, there appeared the hope that the United Nations would, at its meetings, give greater attention to the settling of economic and other problem which, for understandable reasons, had been neglected

with the present state of affairs — the reputation and effectiveness of the United Nations will be endangered, and the cause of peace and peaceful co-operation in the world impaired, although that organisation, with all its weaknesses, has shown itself to be the most adequate and effective international forum and instrument. For although many mistakes have been made in the past, the fact remains that the world, has there been no United Nations actions, would have been thrown into wider and more serious conflicts, and many problems which have been solved or, at least placed under the control of the United Nations, would have been decided differently, and the already difficult situation in relations between the East and West aggravated still further.

If the United Nations is to conquer the tendencies which would turn it off its road and transform it into a mere observer of the actions of the Great Powers, which are not always in accord with the Charter and the interests of peace, it must make an effort — similar to that which was so successful in resisting the aggression in Korea — to take in its hands all the basic and urgent problems and, bearing in mind its mission, find the solution the peaceful world desires. It should first redouble its efforts first to bring about a disarmament agreement, and to solve the Far Eastern problems, which are a threat to peace, and then expand its activities in the economic and financial fields, establish the fund for economic development, and so on. Just as it succeeded in organizing effective forces to defend world peace when the danger of war was so alarmingly near, the United Nations must, in addition to its main task — the maintenance of peace and security, also do everything it can to create a system of measures which would reduce the sources and causes of conflict as much as possible. And it can do this most successfully by working for a reduction of armaments and for the elimination of economic and other differences between peoples and nations.



D. Hammarskjöld

in the years of uncertainty, and that in so doing it would achieve at least as good results as those achieved in organizing counter-actions against aggression and aggressors, not only in Korea. For many countries, particularly small and underdeveloped ones, have been exerting their efforts towards that end. But, owing to objective difficulties and to the endeavours of the Great Powers to settle things among themselves without any outside assistance, that is, without the United Nations, the development of events did not progress as was hoped, and in some cases they took a different direction to that desired by most countries, so that the United Nations was, as it were, pushed into the background. If things continue to progress in this way — and there are signs that some circles are quite satisfied

ANOTHER DUEL OF NOTES

THE reply of the Western Powers to the Soviet notes of July 24 and August 8 came on September 9, i. e., after a long delay caused by the important events that took place after the delivery of the notes, and by the long and difficult consultations between Paris, London and Washington. The three western countries, it is well known, are not in agreement on how international problems should be treated and settled, but they certainly differ most widely when called upon to determine their joint attitude towards the Soviet Union. In this respects the American attitude reflects her growing strength and inclination to use the arguments of force, since she considers that a policy based on any other arguments would be tantamount to a capitulation to the Soviet Union, which will never be accepted in America, as long as there is the belief that she can force the solutions she desires. On the other hand, the attitude of her European partners is quite different, and their language, when communicating with the East, is more moderate, a language which does not reveal any weakness or mistrust of their own forces, but the belief that such a language is more effective in relaxing tension and in evading conflicts.

Finally the three Western Powers found a joint platform, and no one can say that the time they spent in consultation was spent in vain. The Western Powers have now accepted the Soviet proposal for a four power conference and for talks on the problem of security, but they lay down two conditions. Firstly, the Soviet Union should declare and prove its readiness to conclude a treaty with Austria on the basis of the plan the Soviets themselves have been insisting on for years, and which the Western Powers accepted at the Berlin Conference at the beginning of this year, when Molotov prevented agreement by putting forward new conditions; and, secondly, the Soviet Union should show its readiness to approve general elections in Germany as a preliminary step in the solving of the German problem, as was proposed in Berlin last January. If these conditions are fulfilled, the Western Powers will be ready to start talks as proposed by the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, no one can criticize the Western Powers for speaking in their notes about the problem of disarmament, which had also been discussed at the Berlin Conference. This time the Western Powers maintain that the problem is becoming urgent, and that, in their opinion, any progress in the field of disarmament would clear up the atmosphere, improve international relations and make the solving of many other problems easier. In this respect they express their hope that the Soviet Union will cooperate on the basis of the existing plans for disarmament.

This problem is certainly urgent, and it was treated by the General Assembly at its last year's session, when the Great Powers were asked to find ways and means for an agreement, at least on the basic principles. The United Nations Disarmament Com-

mission has not made any progress in this matter, but the problem is being discussed, and it is to be hoped that some success will yet be achieved. If an agreement on disarmament is to be reached, however, both the Soviet Union, which has not been too ready to cooperate in this field, and the United States, which likewise has not been eager to exert any great efforts, will have to cooperate more fully.

Whether the lengthy announcement of the Soviet Foreign Ministry of September 9 was made in anticipation of the Western reply, which is convincing and constructive, or whether its announcement was merely the product of the tactics of the Soviet Union, which, at definite time intervals, repeats definite moves, usually accompanied by well worn phrases and slogans, no one can say. In any case the move failed completely; if it was the expression of a calculated policy towards France, it was badly timed, and produced a contrary effect to what was intended.

It may be asked whether a straight positive or negative reply to the Soviet proposals would not have been more suitable than the reply actually sent. A clear rejection of the Soviet proposals, without any explanations or counter proposals, would have left the initiative in Soviet hands. On the other hand, it is quite clear that it is difficult for the Western Powers to accept all Soviet proposals without any conditions, since it has been proved that the Soviet Union exploits international meetings and conferences to create certain illusions. But in doing this the Soviet Union, consciously perhaps, arms those circles in the United States which use Soviet tactics as a reason to reject talks with her. The Soviets should accept at least one of the forwarded conditions and, let us say, agree to consider and settle the problem of Austria, whereby a road would be open for further talks without any conditions.

BOTH SIDES OF MANILA

THE United States, Great Britain, France, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Siam and Pakistan concluded a Military and Political Treaty in Manila, the capital city of the Philippines, on September 6. These countries now say that their Treaty is of a regional character, in full conformity with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, and they often compare it with the Atlantic Pact, together with which it is to make a wider, in fact, a universal organization, which will be still further strengthened in the future by a similar arrangement in the Near and Middle East. The provisions of this Treaty provide for cooperation between the member states in all fields, and they will use that cooperation both to suppress any undesirable movement in their own countries and to control a wider area of Asia and the Pacific, which is, in their opinion, endangered by the People's Republic of China.

The assertion that the Manila Treaty is similar to the Atlantic Pact and that it is of a regional character as allowed

and provided for by the United Nations Charter, is a debatable point, but that is of no significance now. What is far more important is the question whether the Treaty, as the expression of a definite policy, is capable — under present conditions in Asia and the rest of the world — of making a contribution to the real strengthening of peace in Asia and to the security of its member states, which persistently maintain that that is their sole aim.

In the years of the cold war, as well as later, in the period of lessened tension, the non-Soviet world, which strove to isolate the Soviet policy of domination, could have tried — and, according to some people, did try — by pursuing a correct policy in Asia, to enlist the support and cooperation of the independent and peaceloving countries of that continent, which viewed with reserve and mistrust both the intentions of the West and the manoeuvres and schemes of the Soviet Union. At the same time there were many reasons to believe that a policy which recognized and accepted the reality in China, would be capable of eliminating or, at least of neutralizing Soviet influence in that part of the world, and that would have strengthened the positions of the freedom-loving world against Soviet aims, as long as they were directed towards world domination. Although the advantages of such a policy were evident and attractive to the world public and to many countries of Asia and Europe, it was often hampered by the inability of the leading American circles to understand relations and developments in Asia. As a result, all attempts to bring about a better understanding between independent Asia and the rest of the non-Soviet world have failed. But that does not mean that there is no longer any need for reconciliation between them, or that it cannot be achieved by good will. The western world, if it still wants to strengthen peace in the world, primarily in Asia, must exert further efforts to come to an understanding with the independent part of Asia, and to pursue a different policy towards China.

Viewing things in this light, the Manila Treaty does not seem to have been a move inspired by the wish to set up better cooperation with Asia or to neutralize China, which might become a collaborator in an aggressive policy. One may therefore, be justified in expecting that the policy formulated in Manila will make independent Asia draw away still further from the west, thus increasing the feeling of insecurity in that part of the world, and possibly leading to greater and closer ties between independent Asia and China, as well as between China and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the members of the Manila Conference seem to have decided that the settlement of various problems should be sought for and achieved through force — in the battle field, if necessary — and not as proposed by Europe, i. e., by combining force with realism, and by settling matters through mutual agreement, and in peace.

From minor elements of the Manila Treaty, one might conclude that it represents a compromise between two

opposing conceptions, and that the whole situation would now be different had not Asia, in a direct way, and Europe, in an indirect way, influenced both individual provisions and the whole text of the Treaty. But, be that as it may, one thing is clear. In Manila, Europe gave up the position she is successfully trying to maintain in her own affairs.

After the conclusion of the Treaty, Dulles visited some Asian countries, including Formosa, to which he promised full America's support in the event of an attack by China. Whether he gave this encouragement to Formosa also on behalf of the other signatories to the Manila Treaty, it is difficult to say, but considering the timing of his step, and other circumstances, there are certain to be many people who will believe that he did so. The Chiang Kai Shek Government, whose existence depends on the tension between China and other countries, particularly the United States, has always endeavoured to increase that tension. And after the Manila Treaty was concluded, and after Dulles made the said guarantee, Chiang Kai Shek began daily attacks on the Chinese mainland, which might now lead to complications that the world has been trying so hard to avoid.

Seeing that the real Asia was not represented in Manila, and that Europe did not succeed in defending her position there, the policy adopted cannot produce beneficial results. It may on the contrary, have negative consequences, such as a possible awakening of Formosa and similar forces in that part of the world, which are likely to become dangerous to peace and security.

EUROPEAN POLICY AFTER EDC

It is satisfactory to see that the final French rejection of the EDC Treaty has not affected the confidence of the majority of European countries in the idea of European co-operation itself, and that it has not weakened their readiness to seek a solution to the problem of Europe's security. True, some circles at first reacted unfavourably, particularly in the United States, where much was said about the need for a change in American policy in Europe, and in Western Germany, where the Chancellor himself made some hasty statements which were not altogether flattering to France, and which gave the true supporters of the European po-

litical considerable anxiety. But the European countries fortunately refused to follow this unfavourable reaction, just as they refused to pay any attention to the clumsy Soviet praises of those who, for their own reasons, opposed the EDC Treaty, since that would have only increased the present difficulties of certain European countries.

What is characteristic of the European political scene is the constant succession of plans and proposals for the settling of the problem of Europe. After having firmly stated what she does not want, France does not seem to be quite decided as to what she does want, although Mendes France has said that, in his opinion, Franco-



Anthony Eden

German rapprochement and greater British obligations towards the continent should be the basis of a future solution, which would, at the same time, allow for improvements in the relations between the East and West. This otherwise positive French attitude, however,

does not take into account the fact that the present limits, i. e., the limits of Little Europe, have proved to be too narrow for an acceptable settlement of the great European problem. Mendes France, too, holds that the future solution must be effected through NATO, forgetting that such a settlement could, and probably would, bring in its wake the consequences the French Parliament tried to evade by rejecting the EDC Treaty.

In contrast to the French attitude, it is almost certain that Britain, which views the whole matter in the light of her own imperial standpoint, does not intend to have her hands tied in what is for her a regional arrangement, whose solution should be based

on the balance of power between France and Germany, which would, together with Britain, be as powerful as the Soviet Union or the United States. A „European” solution, therefore, would best suit British requirements. At present Eden is visiting the western capitals, where he is endeavouring to decrease the French demands for British guarantees and reduce non-European influence as much as possible, and so pave the way for a solution which would, in essence, correspond to the EDC idea, and whose form — by allowing Germany's limited rearmament and conditional participation in the Atlantic Pact — would satisfy American—German plans. Being aware of the traditional British attitude towards European problems, it is not surprising to see that, in the present changed situation in Europe, London is not willing to seek a solution outside the countries which were to have made up the European Defence Community, however acceptable it might be. France. For Britain Europe with which her ties have usually been conditional and indirect, represents only a small part of her world interests.

Lately the Soviet Union has made a number of proposals in relations to the European problems, but it has not succeeded in contributing to the clearing up of the European situation, nor has it increased the feeling of security in Europe. These Soviet proposals, which were not considered apart from the general Soviet attitude, have not increased the confidence of the European people in Soviet policy. It is neither accidental nor insignificant that most endeavours to oppose the obscure and troubling tendencies of American policy are paralyzed by the attitude and moves of the Soviet Union, for neither of these two countries can justify its attitude by the attitude of the other.

Regarding the present situation, one is likely to reach a paradoxical conclusion. On the one hand, it seems that matters, in Europe are deteriorating, and, on the other, they seem to be improving, particularly if one takes into account that an agreement may soon be reached in the field of security. The main reason for the former is the inability or unwillingness of the Western Powers to overstep the former narrow limits and exert their efforts in a new direction, which would lead not only to an acceptable solution of the European problem, but also to equal cooperation between a greater number of countries, so that in time such a settlement would gradually become the basis for real European unity.

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OPINIONS ON ACTUAL PROBLEMS

Aleš BEBLER

Yugoslavia and Europe

This article by Aleš Bebler, which we publish in abridged form, appeared in the September issue of the well-known German review „AUSSENPOLITIK“. The article was written before some of the more recent international events took place (the conclusion of the Bled Alliance, the decision on EDC in French Parliament etc) which could not, therefore, be dealt with.

FOR several years already the ominous cloud of aggression has been darkening the European sky. Experience has shown that the danger of aggression increased rapidly from the moment when the Soviet Union tried to subjugate Yugoslavia. The other European countries soon realised, however, that these appetites were not limited only to the Balkans, and they therefore took steps to ensure their security and peace in Europe. It would seem that this was most vividly realised by the Balkan countries, which therefore approached the strengthening of their security in so resolute a manner that they achieved a success of European significance in this field. The fact that Balkan tripartite cooperation was favourably received in Europe and — what is particularly gratifying — that it was welcomed by the German public, only strengthens our conviction that we have created a solid instrument of peace whose importance by far exceeds the limits of the Balkan peninsula.

The recent visit of President Tito to friendly Turkey and Greece opened a new phase in Balkan cooperation. The question which is often asked in the still „non-united“ Europe, i. e., what is the secret of the rapid and successful cooperation of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey — has a simple answer.

In the first place there is the genuine need and wish for multiple cooperation, which takes on new and ever better forms in the course of time. Consequently no definite form, to which all members were required to adjust themselves, was set in advance. On the contrary. The fruitful and rapid success of Balkan cooperation resulted from the attitude of the three countries, who regulate their cooperation themselves, as suits them best. Some non-Balkan powers stubbornly persisted in their attempts to impose different forms of cooperation and in some way postpone or make conditions for the signing of the Balkan Agreement. Such irresponsible manoeuvres are of course most welcome to the Soviet Union. It is hard to understand, however, that they went even so far as to ignore the needs of general security, which brought them the unconcealed support of the Soviet bloc countries.

One of the basic preconditions for sincere cooperation is that the settlement of controversial and outstanding issues must not be made a condition of the settlement of soluble problems. By so doing one strays from the problems

to be resolved, thus creating a psychosis of intolerance and uncertainty. Yugoslavia is not in the slightest degree to blame for the fact that Italy (by her unreasonable policy of linking up all internal and external problems with Trieste) has only succeeded in tying her own hands and putting herself in an unenviable political position as regards the Balkan peoples and a good many other European countries as well. The political isolation of Italy has certainly never been the objective of Yugoslav policy, nor do we rejoice at it. We have stressed the need for cooperation on countless occasions, apart from other reasons, for the purpose of creating a more peaceful and secure atmosphere in Southern Europe. But we have always been rebuffed by the stubborn intolerance and hostile anti-Yugoslav campaigns on the other side of the Adriatic. It has also been revealed that the frequent political concessions made by the West for the purpose of aiding the „recovery of Italian democracy“ have had a negative and even directly opposite effect. The policy pursued by the Italian government has led to an absurd situation, in which the Trieste problem has become a subject of constant blackmail and extortion of concessions on other matters. According to such logic it would be better not to resolve this problem at all, so as to be able to exert pressure in all fields of home and foreign policy, such as the making of conditions for the ratification of the EDC Treaty and the incomprehensible opposition to Balkan cooperation.

Further the most important reason for the promotion of the Ankara Agreement into a military alliance is the common and serious awareness of the need for security and ensurance of national defences of the three countries. If the fact that war and peace are indivisible today, particularly in this sensitive part of Europe, is taken as a starting point, all postulates on the possibility of isolation from the consequences of eventual aggression are illusory, and in the long run defeatist. On the contrary, abstract neutralist delusions only encourage the aggressor in his intentions. The only possible psychological and physical precaution against aggression is to pursue an active peace-loving policy, and be ready to defend oneself. It is not an exaggeration to say that Yugoslavia would not be what she is today had she not adhered to this principle, her frontiers having been seriously threatened only a few years ago. The Balkans as a whole have already acquired sufficient experience in this respect, as these countries were always deprived of the privilege of being mere observers in wartime, and such a privilege would be completely impossible at present. Any conflict, however remote from the heart of Europe, would inevitably acquire an international character, maybe localised at the best, but never local. It is on this fundamental truth, supplemented by our own experience, that the realism and the justified defensive preparedness of the three powers, as expressed in the Ankara Agreement of February 1953, and the subsequent military alliance, are based.

Europe is still the focal point of world events. Is she to fulfil her role successfully she must obey the old adage: *Medice, cura te ipsum!*

We do not wish to enter in all the reasons underlying the unsolved European problems. They are various and, as a whole, represent the political heritage of the balance of power which emerged from World War II. Nevertheless, from the subjective point of view, much can still be done for their solution. Is it possible that so many forms of European cooperation are unable to overcome the weak point of the past and ensure the security of their members? Why do a series of countries with the same proclaimed moral and legal principles, with even a definite form of parliamentary democracy, have difficulties in finding a common language?

Cooperation must transcend the national framework in scope and conception. However apodictical this may seem, it is true that the transcendence of the national elements requires their previous and parallel affirmation in an equal relationship with other countries. To be more precise, in cooperation there cannot be leaders and followers. This is one facet of the question. The other is that one must be realistic and refrain from proclaiming every conception of cooperation as a limitation of national sovereignty and independence. If we add that one should also sincerely eliminate and check all phenomena which might disturb our neighbours and remind them of bad experiences in the past, that neighbours should be regarded with more confidence and without the drawing of frequently unnecessary analogies with the past, it would seem to us that we have pointed out some of the most common forms of non-confidence and „disunity” in Europe.

Having assumed substantial burdens and obligations in conjunction with her partners as regards the united resistance of Europe towards aggression, Yugoslavia approached with great interest the solution of other outstanding European problems which still provoke justified anxiety. Among the spate of such problems there is one whose paramount importance absorbs the diplomatic activity of many governments, and for which responsible persons have so far been unable to devise a satisfactory and peaceable solution. This is the problem of German unification. In spite of the promise given by the great powers after the end of the war to create a peace-loving and democratic Germany by common effort, the latter to this very day remains divided between East and West.

Yugoslavia has long since realised that such a state of affairs in the heart of Europe is dangerous, and has stressed on several occasions that it should be brought to an end as soon as possible, thus enabling a united Germany to become a factor of peace in Europe. Despite the fact that

the Western powers have not always done all in their power to achieve German unity without undue delay, events have nevertheless shown that the USSR is the most to blame for the present division of Germany, because of its consistent policy of safeguarding its new positions acquired in Europe, in which Moscow wishes to play a hegemonic role. This situation in Europe has called forth the justified reaction of the free peoples and brought the necessity to unite in the face of common danger into the foreground. No effort should be spared to bring about the consolidation of Europe, and peace in general. Bearing all this in mind, we have nothing in principle against the inclusion of Germany in such a Europe, and the building up of her armed forces, which she needs both for her own defence and the defence of peace. We likewise consider completely justified the efforts of the Federal German Republic to achieve sovereignty and equal rights as soon as possible. The necessity of previously eliminating all dangers which might ensue for the European peoples if any eventual resurgence of the unpacific and undemocratic phenomena stemming from the recent past are not immediately suppressed should in no case be overlooked. This however, by no means implies that we share the opinion of those European circles which impede the rapprochement of the European peoples and thus favour the forces of aggression by the aggravation of local problems.

Taking the need to coordinate our joint efforts for the manifold rapprochement of the European countries as her starting point, Yugoslavia has stressed her readiness to take part in European cooperation on several occasions. Being herself a European country, linked by vital interest to the rest of Europe, Yugoslavia is fully aware that she should play the role assigned her by her international position and possibilities.

The establishment of mutual confidence between the European peoples and the quest for those forms of cooperation which in a given moment are best suited to the specific position and needs of all partners represents the first step on this road. Relations between countries who were formerly enemies play an important part in this respect. This is why our relations with postwar Germany are also important to us Yugoslavs. We have made great efforts to overcome mistrust and sombre memories of the past. There were both obstacles and unsolved questions on this path, but our post-war relations developed and a common language concerning many problems has gradually been devised, thus enabling mutual cooperation to lead the way to the rapprochement of our two countries.

L. ERVEN

The European Dilemma

THE road followed so far by the policy of collective security in Europe has been broken off abruptly by the recent decision of the French Parliament to remove from the agenda all further discussions on the ratification of the EDC Treaty. Thus this treaty — which was signed as early as May 27, 1952 by the responsible governments of six West European countries, and which had already been ratified by four of its signatories, the only exceptions being France and Italy — was finally placed in the archives of diplomatic history as an unsuccessful attempt to achieve West European integration. If this treaty was predestined to failure, in view of the general circumstances that prevailed, then it is perhaps better for the idea of European cooperation that it happened over a question of procedure rather than as a consequence of a noisy showdown between the adherents and opponents of EDC.

The policy initiated by EDC has now reached a fateful turning point. It is necessary to chart a new course; there are several ways to choose from, while suggestions are pouring in from all sides.

The EDC Treaty was signed under the conditions of disquiet and anxiety provoked by the trend of international developments; the outbreak of war in Korea; the allied misunderstandings in Berlin and elsewhere. It was envisaged as an integral part of the NATO system of collective defence, and as a solution of the problem of West German military participation in the collective defence of Europe. It likewise contained a complicated formula providing for the integration of the West German armed forces in the European army, without the risk, as alleged by its adherents, of resurgent German militarism.

In point of fact, five of the six signatories of the Paris Treaty were occupied by Germany during World War II, while the sixth forms part of Germany. Today it is truly no longer a part of the old Germany as it is invested with a different spirit and different policy, but notwithstanding the confidence shown towards Western Germany, which should provide a basis for new international relations with that country, memories of the regrettable events of the recent past are all too vivid to allow the allaying of all

fears lest history should repeat itself. Thus the problem of military cooperation with Western German was exceedingly complex, and was further complicated by a psychological factor.

In the period of the cold war, during which the idea of EDC was conceived, all six signatories were threatened by a common danger, and felt the need to create a common defence system. But in order to enable Western Germany, which was disarmed in accordance with the provisions of the Peace Treaty, to become a useful ally in this system of collective defence, it was necessary to free her of the restrictions and interdictions of the Treaty regarding the organisation of armed forces and rearmament. What precautions could be taken to prevent the newly armed Germany from reverting to her old policy, to prevent the former forces from seizing power and leading Germany, thus rehabilitated and strengthened, back to the policy of German imperialism?

The EDC Treaty attempted to answer this question, and the first formula came from the French, in the so-called Pleven Plan. The basic idea of this plan was to permit the organisation of the German army, but not the creation of German commanding cadres nor a German High Command, as it stipulated the establishment of a common army of the Western Powers, into which small units of the German army would be incorporated. The European army would also have its own command of a supra-national character, and its own budget. The organisation, allocation of units, armament, supply, training, and formation of the commanding cadres were exempt from the competence of the national governments, and transferred to the competence of the supra-national authority or international institutions. The European Army was to have been placed under the command of the NATO Supreme Commander.

The Pleven Plan was actually a counter-proposal to the American demand that Western Germany be rearmed and included in NATO, this being against the wishes of all the Western Powers at that time; and it was also put forward in the hope of forestalling the eventual conclusion of bilateral agreements between Western Germany and the USA in the field of rearmament and military aid, as a consequence of their refusal to admit the former into NATO. But from the inception of the NATO it was clear that the USA set a high value, on the German military potential in the system of European defence. The subsequent EDC Treaty adopted the conception and mechanism of the Pleven Plan, with notable emendments and modifications as regards the structure, functions, and competence of the supra-national bodies, thus mitigating certain inequalities in the status of Western Germany, and increasing the German quota in the European army.

The EDC Treaty was not only a formula for the system of security in Western Europe, but also a manifestation of the general national policy pursued by the French Government of that time towards Germany. Consequently EDC could be considered as an equivalent of the Coal and Steel Pool, in the field of national defence. These two communities offered a solution of the dilemma in which French policy towards Germany had fallen. A sovereign and armed Germany would represent a potential threat to the peace and security of the neighbouring states. It was necessary to enable the German army and the German defence forces to take part in European defence, while concurrently preventing Germany from restoring her dominant position in Europe, which would be rendered possible by her military and economic power and potential.

The conception of EDC derived from a French suggestion, and was accepted by all the interested states, but it was precisely in the French Parliament that this Treaty failed.

It may on the face of it seem strange and incomprehensible that France, who fears the resurgence of German militarism and German force on the one hand should, on the other hand, repudiate the formula which placed the development, quotas, cadres, rearmament and use of the West German military forces under the control of a supra-national body, including France and the other members of this community, who shared her fears.

In extensive discussion and polemics in French political circles and public during the past few years many arguments, political, legal, historical, psychological, theoretical and practical, relevant and irrelevant, were cited by the opponents of EDC. We shall try to draw a general conclusion from the multitude of arguments which may have influenced the French opponents of EDC to reject it, and devise special reasons for the justification of their attitude.

The idea of EDC was compromised in the opinion of most Frenchmen even in its initial stages, when it became clear that Great Britain, which the Pleven Plan envisaged as a member of the European Army, did not intend to join this organisation, and that neither she nor the USA were prepared to offer guarantees for the stability of EDC regime which France demanded. Similar guarantees were finally given by Great Britain and the USA, although not in a wholly satisfactory manner; but it was then too late, as a hostile majority had already been formed in France. Although a Treaty of six countries, a vast number of Frenchmen considered EDC primarily a Franco-German problem, and a relationship in which the disproportionate power and possibilities of the other partner were all too obvious. Therefore the French sought the support of countries other than their EDC allies, i.e., America and Great Britain, for the purpose of restoring the balance.

However, the marked preference shown by the USA for conceptions sanctioning the broadest possible participation of Germany in Western defence, and the necessity of rehabilitating Germany from the military point of view could only increase French doubts as to the efficacy of American guarantees in case of a crisis in Franco-German relations.

On the other hand, it seems that most Frenchmen did not believe in the efficacy of the legal mechanism of supra-national competence and control over the prospective development of the German economic and military potential. The experiences of the already established Coal and Steel Pool in which, thanks to its genuine possibilities, German industry is steadily acquiring a leading position, only came as yet another confirmation of these fears. Thus all the limitations of sovereignty and other restrictions, which were primarily directed against Germany, appeared to the Frenchmen as more detrimental and difficult for France than for Germany. The equality of legal conditions often results in the actual inequality of the weaker partner. And in EDC there would be a broad gap between the partners, as far as actual potential, wealth, enterprise and resourcefulness were concerned. Under such conditions the principle of sovereignty, which the French Government had partly renounced in the EDC Treaty, would actually have offered France greater guarantees than the principle of supra-nationality, which she adopted for the purpose of limiting German sovereignty.

In order to discern and comprehend many subsequent dissensions and difficulties, particularly between France and the USA, it is necessary to stress that certain misunderstandings in the conception of EDC prevailed from the very beginning. While the USA regarded the proposed organisation primarily as a mechanism which would supplement NATO, thus completing the system by the incorporation of the German armed forces, France considered it an instrument which should insure her against the restoration of German militarism, while Germany contemplated it as a mechanism which would free her of occupation control, and restore her right to military rehabilitation. These different motives placed different stress on various elements of EDC in the policy of each of these countries. This is why the dilemma of so-called Western Defence is so complex, and the ways indicated so uncertain and contradictory.

If the problem is considered from the German standpoint it seems less complicated, while France, for which the problem implied a certain loss, naturally worried as to whether the initial sacrifice would not bring other losses in its wake. Thus it is all the more understandable why Germany strove so much for an agreement which was certainly created to limit her sovereignty while accepting her military contribution for Western defence without the corresponding recognition of all her rights as a sovereign state. The EDC way may have seemed more certain to Western Germany than direct recognition of sovereignty and inclusion in NATO, which depended on French consent.

The EDC Treaty attempted to resolve the problem of West German participation in European defence, and also provide a basis for the achievement of West European integration, the subsequent creation of a united Europe, or a United States of Europe. Thus the advocates of European unity also championed the EDC, and the breakdown of the EDC Treaty is a disappointment for the advocates of European unity. The failure of the Treaty and all that was said in the preceding discussions revealed clearly the extent of the difficulties which still impede political integration in Western Europe.

After the vote was taken in the French Parliament, France was subjected to sharp criticism by almost all her

prospective allies in EDC, and by the majority of other NATO allies. There were many recriminations, and even threats. It seemed for a moment that France had embarked on the dangerous road of isolationism, and that the entire policy of collective security in Europe had been placed in jeopardy. The Americans, who have a big say in this policy, did not conceal their dissatisfaction, nor their wish to revert to the policy of direct German rearmament. Nevertheless it would seem that this was more the result of temporary dissatisfaction than a carefully considered attitude.

We think it would be a mistake to underrate the significance of the Franco-German problem and all the factors underlying this issue, either at the expense of France or Germany. It would likewise be a mistake to underestimate the importance of Franco-German cooperation in European policy and within the system of collective security. The contribution of both France and Germany to this policy can be wholly effective only if Franco-German collaboration is placed on sound foundations. Neither alternatives or surrogates would be a good solution, as a substitute is always inferior to the real thing, while an alternative settlement would invariably mean the acceptance of the less favourable solution. Events have shown that it was impossible to implement EDC as laid down by the Treaty, and that in present conditions the idea of European integration is still a premature one. It is necessary not only to change

the mechanism, but to open up broader prospects for European cooperation.

Perhaps the scope of this cooperation (and not only its mechanism), which was envisaged in a period of international tension and chiefly limited to the sphere of defence, had become too narrow. The security and stability of peace requires not only the urgent implementation of defence measures, but also a long term constructive and peace-loving policy. This does not depend only on the strengthening and organisation of defence, although it is its basic feature, but also on the extent and quality of international cooperation in other fields. This is why this cooperation should be as broad as possible, as otherwise it would inevitably degenerate into the creation of antagonistic blocs.

The problem called forth by the European dilemma and the German problem will be discussed, and possibly resolved within the narrow circle of the countries directly concerned. But the system of European cooperation in general requires the revision of those forms in which it has been manifested so far. If the programme of integration is still too optimistic for our times, the idea of broad international cooperation based on the principle of equal rights, the coordination of common interests, and general welfare and prosperity, has undeniably made considerable headway as a factor which is gradually creating a new international system.

G. D. H. COLE

Is a Third Force Possible?

THE British Labour Party has now issued a pamphlet under the title **In Defence of Europe**, which is a defence of the attitude taken by the majority of the party leaders on the question of re-arming Western Germany. The pamphlet is a strong partisan statement in favour of this course, within the framework of the European Defence Community; but it also makes plain that, should E.D.C. fail to secure acceptance, the party leaders would endorse re-arming Western Germany as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation rather than not at all. The pamphlet takes no account of the widespread opposition to German re-armament that has been manifested within the ranks of the Labour Party and at recent Trade Union conferences, or of the narrowness of the majorities by which that policy was approved both by the Party in Parliament and by the National Executive. It is clearly intended as part of a propagandist campaign by which the leaders of the majority hope to convince enough of the membership to carry the day at the Labour Party Conference this autumn. It is still doubtful whether they will succeed in doing this. The vote of the Trade Unions, which is the deciding factor at the Party Conference, will undoubtedly be divided; and a good deal will depend on the line taken by the Mineworkers' Union. The two big general workers' Unions will almost certainly support the view of the leadership, whereas the Railwaymen, Engineers, Electricians, Foundry Workers, and Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers will be on the other side. A majority of the Local Labour Parties will probably be against re-arming Germany on any terms. These anticipations, if they are correct, as I think they are unless the situation changes between now and October, leave the final issue in doubt. Clearly, the division inside the Party goes deep, and the feelings on both sides are very strong. The party machine can be relied on to throw its whole weight between now and the Conference into the attempt to swing opinion over to its side; and the opposition to it has no counter-machine at its disposal, and must depend largely on the strength of the instinctive opposition to putting arms into the Germans' hands, especially while Germany remains divided between East and West.

The re-arming of Germany is the immediate issue under debate; but behind it lie much wider issues of international

policy. The Labour Party pamphlet takes the line that the experience of the Berlin Conference clearly demonstrated the unpreparedness of the Russians to make any effective contribution towards a détente, and thus left the West with no alternative to the further building up of its armed strength in Europe in order to be in a position to resist an attack by Russian and Satellite ground forces. This, it argues, is impracticable without a considerable West German contingent; and it concludes that E.D.C. should be ratified and that, should French opposition make this impossible, Western Germany should be admitted as a full partner to N.A.T.O., and should be allowed to establish a national army within the N.A.T.O. organisation.

Most of the opponents of German re-armament in Great Britain deny the premises on which this conclusion rests. They do not regard it as proven that the Russians are unprepared to come to terms, if reasonable terms can be proposed. They regard the Americans, in their present mood, as at least as much responsible as the Russians for the Berlin breakdown; and they hold that a further attempt should be made to negotiate further with the Russians before hope of a détente is given up. Some of them, indeed, go a good deal further than this — as I do myself — and feel that nothing is to be hoped for from the Americans under their present leadership and that Great Britain, rather than be dragged along at their heels either in Europe or in Asia, should not only refuse altogether to acquiesce in German re-armament or to become a partner to any Anti-Communist Pact in the Far East, but should also break away altogether from N.A.T.O. and seek, in conjunction with India and with such other countries as are prepared to collaborate, to establish in the world a Third Force uncommitted to either of the great power blocs, and with the mission of preserving the peace between them by doing everything possible to break down the isolation between them and to re-establish friendly relations over the widest possible field.

There are, however, many in Great Britain who, while they oppose the re-arming of Western Germany, cling to the N.A.T.O. alliance because they are afraid of the consequences of a break with the United States and wish to retain the assurance of American intervention in the event of war in Europe. It is easy to appreciate why this view is

widely held. Obviously, if atomic warfare is left out of account, and account is taken only of ground forces, the Russians and their satellites are, and are likely to remain, in a position to over-run Western Europe and to sweep aside any armies at the disposal of the West European countries in the absence of a powerful German contingent on their side. This has to be admitted by those who take a stand against the proposal to arm the West Germans; and they are bound to argue that the dangers of doing this and of partnership in a N.A.T.O. plan which rests upon it outweigh the advantages. Inevitably, if I thought it at all likely that the Russians were planning, now or in the future, to let loose their armies on the West, I should have, however reluctantly, to accept any measures that appeared to be necessary for resisting such an attack. I do not, however, regard a Russian attack on Western Europe as at all probable save in the event of a general world war having actually been started in some other way. If such a war were started, say in the Far East or in the Middle East, it is of course quite possible that, in the course of it, the Russians would invade the West. But the way to meet this danger is not to take any steps that are calculated to increase it by increasing the danger of general war beginning either in Western Europe or elsewhere. My feeling is both that to re-arm the Western half of a divided Germany will make much greater the risk of war beginning on the German frontier between East and West, and that subservience to American policy is already greatly increasing the danger of general war beginning in South-East Asia or in the Middle East.

I cannot, therefore, consider the question of German re-armament, either within E.D.C. or under N.A.T.O., in isolation from what is happening in the rest of the world. It seems to me to be self-evident that no world détente is possible as long as the Americans insist in maintaining their recognition of Chiang Kai-shek as the ruler of China and in their refusal to accept the actual Government of China as a full member of the United Nations. Nor can I see any hope of a détente as long as the Americans continue to use Japan as a satellite in their war against Communism, or as long as they regard it as their mission to prevent the development of Communism in Asia. It seems to me that the Asian countries ought to be left to settle their own affairs without European or American interference, and that Socialists ought to be on the side of those forces which are seeking to liquidate the relics of imperialism in Asia, and ought to be ready to align themselves with these forces against Americans and Russians alike, but not against China as long as the Chinese are doing no more than range themselves with the opponents of imperialist rule. I want the French out of Indo-China and the British out of Malaya, whether the Governments that replace them are Communist or not. Similarly, of course, I want the Americans out of Korea, the Philippines and Japan; and I hope for a league of Asian States including China as well as India and standing as the champion of the impoverished peoples of the entire Asian continent.

As I am not a Communist, I naturally hope that this Asian League will not be driven to assume a Communist form, though it will have to be democratic enough to carry through the fundamental economic revolution — and in the first place the revolution in land-tenure and land-use — of which most of Asia stands desperately in need. The inevitable consequence of any attempt to build up an anti-Communist bloc in Asia under American-cum-European leadership is to range the non-Asiatic powers included in such a bloc on the side of all the most reactionary forces in Asia, from Japan to the Arab countries and to perpetuate imperialist exploitation. This in turn is bound to outrage democratic nationalist sentiment in all the Asian countries which are struggling for both political and economic emancipation. If Great Britain appears in Asia as the ally of American oil companies, of French reactionary settlers, and of capitalist planters in Malaya, as well as of Japanese, Korean, Siamese and other reactionary régimes, there can be no hope at all for the peaceful development of the Asiatic continent by putting the peoples in possession of the land and enabling them to tackle the tasks of industrialisation for themselves and in their own way. There can be only a prospect of recurrent nationalist revolt, which the Americans will call on their satellites to suppress because they will treat it as Communist aggression; and we shall find ourselves, if no worse, bogged down like the French, in unending imperialist warfare that will sap our resources and prevent us from advancing towards a better social order. Indeed, we may be in for worse than that, if at any point

the Americans summon us to world war on the pretext of resisting the further advance of Communism in Asia.

On the grounds I have given, I am utterly opposed to the acceptance of any commitment, such as the Americans are demanding, that may involve Great Britain in defending imperialist bastions in Asia. Nay more, I am firmly of opinion that Great Britain ought to announce here and now a positive intention to get out of Malaya, with a firm date by which the Malayan people will be left to manage their own affairs, either as members of the British Commonwealth or outside it, as they may freely decide. Only by purging ourselves of imperialism and taking our stand on the side of the Asian peoples in their struggle for freedom can we acquire any moral title to constitute a Third Force fit to interpose itself between American anti-Communist fanaticism and Soviet amorality, which befriends Asian nationalism only in pursuit of its own ends.

This question of the British attitude in Asian affairs is highly relevant to the problems of Europe because it is for the time being in Asia, rather than in Europe, that the opportunity to make a start with creating the Third Force exists. I hope it is clear that, when I speak of a Third Force, I have not in mind a Third Armed Bloc capable of challenging either the United States or the Soviet Union in arms. To attempt the creation of such a force would be foolish, as well as impracticable. What I mean by Third Force is a group of countries, pledged to act together for the keeping of the world's peace and uncommitted to either of the great concentrations of military power. In Asia, Jawaharlal Nehru has already made some attempt to constitute the nucleus of such a group, with Burma and Indonesia as collaborators, but so far he has failed to elicit any response from either Ceylon or Pakistan. Clearly, it is quite beyond the present means of these countries, even if Ceylon and Pakistan could be induced to join them, to constitute a great centre of military power. It is vital to them not to spend on armaments scanty resources that are urgently needed for the improvement of their low standards of living. Nothing, however, of this sort is required of them. What is required is that they shall do their best to expand the openings for trade and intercourse throughout Asia, including China, and that they shall do what they can to coordinate their plans of economic development in such a way as to foster closer relations.

Of course, an Asian Third Force group could not of itself stand effectively between the potential combatants of a third world war. It would need to join hands with a similar group in Europe, and this European group would have to be firmly pledged to a policy of non-interference with the rights of Asians to manage their own affairs. The European group would have to begin by disentangling itself from its existing commitments under N.A.T.O., and thus freeing its hands to follow an independent policy. It would have to renounce all idea of re-arming the western part of divided Germany and to resume negotiations for unifying Germany. What really caused the Berlin Conference to break down was the clear intention of the Americans to make the unification of Germany a step towards the integration of the whole country into the Western bloc, and to create an European army containing both German and American continents. The Russians could not possibly be expected to agree to such a policy, which would have definitely tipped the military balance against them in Europe and would have brought the war danger right up to the frontiers of Poland and Czechoslovakia, with every probability of American backing for German irredentist aspirations and with clear encouragement to exiled groups to stir up trouble inside the Soviet Union itself. The only possible basis for agreed unification of Germany is neutrality, involving limitation of armaments in order to avoid a recrudescence of German militarism in a dangerous form, but involving also that such arms as re-unified Germany does become entitled to possess should be at the call neither of the Soviet Union nor of N.A.T.O.

Of course, such a West European Third Force as I am suggesting is for the present only an aspiration. To achieve it involves changes of Government in all the West European States — changes so far-reaching that clearly they can come about only as the result of a great change of attitude among the European peoples — most of all, of a realisation that it is more dangerous to be allied to the Americans than to do without them because it is mainly from the Americans that the danger of war is for the present most likely to come. The position would be different were the American people to recover from its hysteria and put into office a President and a Congress ready to take the steps necessary to make possible a world détente — above

all else, by recognising the Chinese Government and re-opening full trading relations with the Chinese people. I do not despair of this happening some day, if in the meantime we escape world war; but it clearly will not happen quickly, or merely as an outcome of the victory of Democrats over Republicans. Western Europe needs therefore to formulate its own policy on the assumption that the American attitude will remain for some time, at any rate in relation to China, broadly as it is now; and, if this is assumed, it means that countries which are attached by military commitments to the United States are tied hand and foot from taking any effective steps towards the improvement of world relations, and must either renounce the hope of establishing the conditions necessary for peaceful co-existence or make their effort with their hands free of commitments to follow American policy and from dependence on American help.

This is no doubt a large mouthful for Western Europe to swallow; for it has allowed itself to become deeply dependent on American aid. In the case of Great Britain, however, this dependence has already ended, except for certain forms of military aid with which we could well dispense. It is no doubt harder for France and for Italy to break away from the American purse-strings; but how much of the aid they are actually receiving from the United States is real gain, even in a narrowly economic sense? What they get, and more, they are being made to spend on armaments which they cannot afford — armaments which will be of little avail to them if the Americans and the Russians start pulverising the world with atomic weapons, as they are certain to do if world war actually starts. Great land armies in the West are of value only on the assumption that, in their absence, the Soviet Union would make war on Western Europe; and such an assumption is entirely inconsistent not only with what the Russians say about their intentions but also with their actual conduct in recent years. The Russian policy, as far as it is aggressive in a military sense, is that of using armed force to back up domestic revolution, not that of invading countries in which the potentialities of internal revolution are not present. Such potentialities do not at present exist in any country — certainly not in France or Italy, where the Communist Parties are strongest, or in Western Germany — and if not in these countries, where else? Soviet Communism, in its Russian shape, has nowhere in Europe made itself so attractive in recent years as to win fresh converts: nor is any Western country threatened with early economic collapse on a scale that would bring revolutionary forces to birth. The Western countries, helped by Marshall Aid, which is now at an end, have all made substantial economic recovery. Doubtless, they could all be hit hard by a serious American depression, but hardly to the point of going Communist as a result. Indeed, as matters stand, an American depression would be more likely to strengthen the reactionary forces within them than to drive them towards Communist revolution. The spectacle of Soviet totalitarianism under Stalin's rule has administered a heavy blow at West European Communist chances. Indeed, much too heavy a blow; for it has weakened the will to democratic Socialism as well.

One necessary step towards the creation of the Third Force in Europe is a lessening of anti-Communist feeling among democratic Socialists. The West European Socialists — and for that matter the West European Conservatives as well — are less fanatical about Communism than the Americans, but they are fundamentally no less hostile to it. The difference of attitude arises partly because mass-hysteria is less easily aroused in Western Europe than in the United States; but it arises even more from the practically universal consciousness in Western Europe that war would mean utter ruin and would sweep away the foundations of democratic Socialism and of capitalism together, leaving a sheer void — to be filled, who knows by what? This means that few Europeans are prepared to give first place, as many Americans are, to Anti-Communism, however anti-Communist they may in fact be. They have to give first thought to sheer self-preservation. Hitherto, this has led them to want to keep the Americans in Europe as protectors, both against possible attack from the east and against the re-crudescence of German militarism in the west. Now that the Americans have in effect abandoned the role of protecting Western Europe against the Germans and have become the foremost advocates of re-arming Germany, one most important part of the case for accepting American occupying troops and American bases in Western Europe has

disappeared, leaving only that part of the case which relates to protection against the Soviet Union. This constitutes an opportunity which has not existed hitherto of convincing West European opinion — and above all, Socialist opinion — that this protection is illusory, because it in practice adds to the danger of war, whereas Europe's primary interest is to reduce the points of possible friction wherever they can be reduced.

These are some of the ideas which underlie the re-emergence of discussion in Great Britain — and in France and Italy — concerning the practicability of a Third Force. These ideas are still a long way from taking complete and coherent form; and the obstacles in the way of making them into realities are obviously immense. But they exist and are gaining ground. If the present debate inside the Labour Party ends in the victory of the opponents of German re-armament, that will be only the beginning of a process in the course of which the Party's entire international policy will have to be re-shaped and transformed. Clearly the Conservative Government, whatever doubts its members may feel privately, is not going to give up German re-armament because the Labour Party, by a majority, decides against it — if the Party does so decide. No less clearly, a decision by the Party against its present leadership will leave it without any policy at all — until it gets to work to devise a new one based on accepting its members' decision as a starting point. In formulating such a new policy, it will be necessary to begin with the assumption that, as the Americans clearly will not agree, and as the Christian Parties in Germany and France and Italy will clearly go with the Americans on this issue, it is indispensable to lay plans for turning out not only the Conservative Government in Great Britain but also the Christian Governments of Italy and Germany — and for keeping MM. Bidault and Schuman out of the French Foreign Office. This, however, clearly means re-establishing relations in Italy with the Nenni Socialists and probably with the Communists as well, and in France ceasing to ostracize the Communist Party, with its great working-class following, and attempting to come to terms with it. A Third Force cannot be built without the united support of the working class, or at least of the great majority of it; and this means, in France and Italy, that no such force can be built unless the Communists can be brought to support it, if not to form part of it. Even more evidently, it is necessary to establish friendly relations with the Communists of Yugoslavia. Nor is it less necessary to build up close relations between the Socialist of Western Europe and those of Asia, in order to secure support for close co-operation between the European and the Asian elements of the Third Force at the level of the working-class movements of the countries concerned as well as at the level of inter-governmental action.

A good deal of this runs a long way ahead of what is at present envisaged by many British critics of the British Government's — and the British Labour Party's — subservience to American anti-Communist policies and of the re-armament of Western Germany; for much of this criticism is instinctive rather than rational, and rests on no clear conception of an alternative international policy. These critics will have to arrive at an understanding that the creation of a policy making for peace and understanding cannot be merely a matter of not following the Americans and of not being pro-Russian, but must include a positive attempt to break down the present isolation of the rival „worlds” and to appreciate what is good in Communism even while opposing what is inconsistent with Western beliefs in the value of personal liberty and of free discussion. Especially must they bring themselves to understand that if, in the more backward countries which need a social revolution to unloose the democratic forces within them and to clear the road for the work of social construction, the advanced Western countries continue to manifest themselves as the upholders of the obsolete governing classes and of the foreign capitalist interests which find in them their natural allies, it is not surprising if the friends of the common people in these countries are disposed to accept the claim of the Communist Parties to be acclaimed as liberators from imperialist oppression and manipulation. The Third Force must be neutral between the two power blocs, but it cannot afford to be merely neutral. It must take its stand against exploiting capitalism, against feudalism, and against hysterical Anti-Communism, or it can never become a moral force capable of preventing the world's peoples into the war which it should be every decent and sensible person's first object to prevent.

The Balkan Alliance and the UN Charter

ALL three signatories of the Bled Treaty of military alliance, political cooperation and mutual aid, which was concluded on August 9, 1954, are also members of UNO. In the first paragraph of the Treaty Preamble they „confirm their loyalty to the principles of the UN Charter”. There can be no doubt that this Treaty, both in its basic conception, and in the manner in which this conception is implemented through its provisions, is in full accordance with the letter and spirit of the UN Charter.

The Alliance, as stated explicitly in its fundamental „operative” Article II, is based on Art. 51 of the UN Charter, namely „the right to legitimate individual or collective self-defence”. As this article obviously represents the international legal basis of the Balkan alliance, it might be useful to say a few words on its genesis and scope.

As is known, the system of collective security as envisioned by the creators of the Charter at the San Francisco Conference was based on the principle of monopoly of international legal compulsion, or to be more precise, the centralisation of international legal sanctions in the hands of the organisation. In other words, only UNO was authorised to apply compulsory measures, i. e., resort to force. UNO was invested with these powers for the purpose of preventing aggression, that is, the violation of peace. Any arbitrary recourse to forcible measures by the individual states, every action of „self assistance” in the field of international law was prohibited in principle. This veto, however, was obviously unable to affect the right of the attacked country to defend itself until the mechanism of forcible measures foreseen by the Charter became effective (i. e. until the UNO offered the necessary protection to the victim of aggression). This became all the clearer if the manner in which the problem of compulsory measures was resolved in San Francisco — namely the complete dependence of these measures and their application by consent of the great powers i. e. the permanent members of the Security Council, is borne in mind. Art 51 which confirms the right to legitimate self-defence against „armed aggression” was included in Chapter VII of the Charter, which provides of the action to be taken by the UN in case of „an act of aggression, violation of peace, or threat to peace”. (The term „armed aggression” is used in the French text of the Charter, while the words „armed attack” are used in the English text). The Charter not only confirms the right to legitimate self-defence, but also proclaims it a an inherent (natural) right, i. e., a right inseparable from the very essence of the concept of the State, and consequently inalienable from it. However, while confirming the right to self-defence, the Charter at the same time regulates this right with a precision, even strictness which is completely in accordance with the already mentioned basic conception of the Charter but which, for this very reason, constitutes an innovation in international law. Thus, legitimate self-defence appears, not so much an exception to the UNO system of collective security, but as its necessary supplement. In order that self-defence be in accordance with Art. 51 of the Charter it is necessary: 1) that armed aggression occurs; 2) that the Security Council be immediately informed of the self-defence measures taken; 3) that these measures cease when the Security Council undertakes the measures foreseen by the Charter. By recognising the right of the countries to defend themselves both individually and collectively, and allowing them to come to each other's assistance, considering this likewise a form of self-defence both where the assisting countries and the attacked country are concerned, the Charter establishes to a certain extent a new international legal category of collective self-defence. As stressed by all commentators of Art. 51, its provision that collective self-defence should be organised in advance (i. e. before aggression actually occurs) is completely logical, for the efficacy of these measures would otherwise be extremely dubious. This level of organisation in collective self-defence can be achieved by means of a previous agreement between the countries which consider themselves similarly threatened, namely by concluding an

agreement on collective self-defence. Needless to say, agreements on collective self-defence can only comprise those countries which fulfil the following conditions: 1) that they are really in danger of aggression which would, by violating the territory of one country, vitally threaten the territorial integrity and political independence of others, so that their action can truly be considered as an act of self-defence, and, 2) that they are able to come to each other's aid quickly and efficaciously. Consequently only those countries which are sufficiently close geographically, or in other words which belong to the same geographical area, are eligible. This means that collective self-defence must also be clearly defined geographically, and invested with a definite regional character: this was stressed at the San Francisco conference, and almost all commentators of the Charter agree on this point. On the other hand, collective defence must not necessarily express other forms of unity between the countries it comprises, such as identical social and political systems, ideologies etc. Moreover, it is doubtful that organisations which require unity of such a kind among their members could be considered instruments of collective self-defence in the sense of the Charter, as it would not be possible to limit their aims to defence from armed aggression only. Furthermore, UNO itself, as an universal organisation, is based on the idea that common activities and cooperation between countries with different systems and ideologies are both possible and indispensable. Regional agreements based on ideological exclusiveness would consequently be contrary to this fundamental provision of the Charter, even if they were formally in accordance with the latter.

The agreements on collective self-defence which fulfil all the conditions mentioned and which coincide with the basic objectives and principles of the Charter constitute, under the present circumstances, a necessary element in the system of UN collective security. These agreements, together with the mechanism of collective measures, based on the well known, resolution of „United Action for Peace” represent an indispensable supplement to this system, and partly eliminate the weaknesses and shortcomings it has revealed in practice.)

How does the Balkan Alliance appear in the light of the foregoing?

It is clearly stated in Art. II and VII that the Balkan Alliance is completely based on Art. 51 of the Charter. In the first place armed aggression is foreseen as the *casus foederis* i. e. that condition which according to Art. 51 entitles a country to self-defence (individual or collective). It is characteristic that the Charter draws closest to a definition of aggression on this point by narrowing its concept and thus eliminating or at least greatly reducing the possibility of various aggressive or „preventive” actions to be represented as self-defence and thus shielded by Art. 51. This is also stressed in Art. VII of the Treaty, where the contracting parties assume the obligation to adhere on all points to the Resolution on the duties of countries in case of an outbreak of hostilities as adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 17, 1950, upon the proposal of the Yugoslav delegation, and which provides a practical and objective criterion for the determination of an aggressor. This offers an unequivocal confirmation of the defensive character of the Alliance, and not only in the frequently all too elastic sense of classical international law, but according to the far more precise and strict formulation of the UN Charter. It is further foreseen that the contracting parties will consider „every armed aggression

1) This by no means implies that treaties on collective self-defence, or similar organisations, can replace the system of UN collective security. If they show a tendency to exceed the framework laid down by the Charter, repudiate the UN and take over its attributes, as was recently done in the case of Guatemala, they will come in conflict with the Charter and soon degenerate into something entirely different from what is foreseen by the latter.

against one or more of the signatories as an aggression against all", thus adopting the principle of legal automatism, which is vital in the case of collective defence.²⁾ The contracting parties further assume the obligation in Art. VII in the Treaty that they will immediately inform the UN Security Council of the act of aggression of which they are the victim, as well as the measures of legitimate self-defence taken „and that they will stop these measures when the Security Council takes effective action as laid down in Art. 51 of the Charter". The use of the term „effective" for the purpose of determining more closely the character of the measures to be taken by the Security Council to ensure the cessation of legitimate self-defence, is entirely in the spirit of Art. 51, and is particularly necessary in view of the experience acquired so far, which speaks in favour of the maximum precision in the formulation of this relationship. Lastly, the Alliance of the three Balkan countries is undoubtedly of a regional character, which represents one of the vital, although not explicitly mentioned, elements of organised collective self-defence, according to Art 51 of the Charter. On the other hand, the Alliance comprises countries with different social and political systems and is based on the recognition and full respect of these mutual differences which do not in the least disturb its unity and solidity.

The clause contained in Art. VI, which stipulates that the contracting parties „will in case of armed aggression against a country towards which one or more of the signatories have obligations of mutual aid at the time of the signature of the Treaty... will consult each other on the suitable measures in accordance with the aims of the UN, for the purpose of resolving the situation thus created in their area", is another provision which reveals its complete congruence with Art. 51 of the Charter. This provision, which is based on the recognition of the obvious fact that peace is indivisible, precludes the possibility that the signatory countries should resort to measures deriving from other obligations, treaties or combinations, which are contrary to the UN objectives or the policy of collective security. This clause again emphasises the regional character and complete independence of the Balkan Alliance and its congruence with the UN Charter.

However the close harmony of the Balkan Alliance with the UN Charter is not limited only to its congruence with Art. 51. Collective security in a narrower sense, i. e., collective measures in case of aggression or violation of peace (as referred to in Chapter VII which also includes Art. 51 of the Charter) represent one of the forms of UN activity for the preservation of world peace and security. This second, fundamental aspect of this activity is the settlement of international disputes by peaceful methods. These two aspects do not preclude each other, as they are mutually supplementary. In this respect also the Balkan Alliance coincides completely with the Charter. While offering the member countries powerful protection of their security, the Charter at the same time, in Art. 1, confirms their obligation to „settle all international disputes in which they may be involved in accordance with the provisions of

²⁾ There can be no question of self-defence if a country does not adopt, legally speaking, the same attitude towards armed aggression against the other country with which it is linked by a treaty on collective self-defence as that which it would take towards an attack on its own territory. What concrete measures will be undertaken (military or others) does not affect the essence of the matter. It is important that the measures be those which the contracting parties „consider necessary for joint defence".

the UN Charter, and to refrain from threats or use of force in all international disputes, in any way contrary to the objectives of the UNO". This provision constitutes an entity with the clauses from Art. II and VII, thus completing the political profile of the Alliance, and making it not only an instrument of collective security in the Balkan area, but also a contribution to the peaceful, regulation of European relations and the easing of tension in international relations. If it is also borne in mind that the Alliance constitutes only one form of cooperation between the signatories whose scope is steadily extended so as to embrace the numerous facets of mutual relations of the three countries and which, according to the Charter, represent indivisible elements of the general problem of peace and security, it is easy to realise to what an extent the Balkan Alliance is imbued by the peaceloving and progressive philosophy of UNO.

Another extremely important feature of the Balkan Alliance, which places it within the framework of the Charter, namely, the fact that it is based on the complete and consistent application of the principle of sovereign equality, which is one of the fundamental principles of the Charter, and a keystone of UNO, should likewise not be overlooked. The sovereign equality of the signatories of the Balkan Alliance is manifested in two ways. On the one hand the relationship of the three countries is placed on a basis of complete equality. The Treaty does not contain a single provision which leaves any loophole for inequality either in rights or duties, as is sometimes the case with those regional organisations characterised by vast differences in the economic, political and military possibilities of the individual partners. On the other hand, neither the Alliance nor the United Nations Charter contain any supranational elements which demand the limitation of sovereignty to a greater extent than necessitated by membership in UNO and the level of maturity attained by world conditions for higher and more developed forms of international cooperation in the present period.

Lastly, apart from these features of a general and essential character, which indicate the close congruence between the Charter and the Alliance concluded by the three Balkan countries, there are other elements in the Treaty which confirm its consistent adherence to the Charter. Thus Art. IX explicitly stresses, although this clearly ensues from the entire text of the Treaty, that its provisions do not in any way affect the rights and obligations of the contracting countries ensuing from the UN Charter. This is actually a confirmation of Art. 103 of the Charter, which stipulates that „in case the obligations of the UN members deriving from the Charter and those ensuing from whatever other international Treaty do not coincide, those laid down by the Charter will have priority". Art. XIV of the Treaty which foresees its registration at UNO, in accordance with Art. 102/I of the Charter, should also be mentioned. As far as we know, no other treaties or alliances concluded during the past few years contain a similar clause.

As can be seen from the foregoing, the Treaty of military alliance political cooperation and mutual aid between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia is fully coordinated, both with the general principles of the Charter and with all its relevant provisions. As such, the Alliance undoubtedly indicates the way which will, under the present international conditions, lead most surely to the creation of such a system of collective security as that envisaged by the Charter on the day it was adopted by UNO.

Pacts of Human Rights before the UN General Assembly

AT its summer session the Economic and Social Council of UNO decided to submit the draft pacts on the fundamental human rights to the General Assembly. Work on the enactment of these pacts thus entered into its decisive phase. ECOSOC took this important step with a notable lack of enthusiasm, and it can be said that the decision was finally reached because evasion was no longer possible. More than nine years have elapsed since seven extremely clearly defined provisions dealing with the insurance and promotion of human rights were hopefully included in the Charter at the San Francisco Conference, while discussions and preparations were initiated seven years ago.

The US delegation was the only one which did not vote for the submission of the pacts to the General Assembly. The Republican administration stated officially that the USA would not sign the pacts, while the resolution of Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio, which demanded the withdrawal of the US representatives from UNO before discussion on the pacts opened, was advanced in Congress as early as on July 1, 1951. Only a few years there was a significant reversal of the US attitude from one of the most active sponsors of the pact to open antagonism to the most important action taken by UNO in the field of human rights.

The USA is not the only UN member with a negative attitude towards the pacts, as its views are more or less shared by the colonial powers and condoned by the other advanced countries, although the latter display greater caution.

As for the Soviet Union and the other East European countries, in view of all that has happened and present conditions in these countries, formal statements by their delegates in favour of the pacts can scarcely create an illusion of sincerity where the intentions of these governments are concerned.

Opposition towards the pacts increased, as work on their preparation proceeded. As the draft entered their final stages, it became increasingly clear that respect of human rights cannot remain a mere slogan to serve in ideological skirmishes. During their preparation a front consisting of the small and undeveloped countries was formed in the UN, which insisted that the individual rights and freedoms should be considered as part of economic, social and national development. Apart from civic and social rights, these pacts comprise economic, social and cultural rights, while the enjoyment of individual rights and freedoms is closely related to national independence. Both pacts also include provisions regarding the respect of the political and economic sovereignty of nations. This is the real reason why the objections and reservations voiced by the western powers concerning certain details gradually changed into a general attitude of reserve and hostility towards the pacts in general.

A spate of legal, philosophical, political and other arguments have been advanced in defence of this negative attitude towards the pacts. It is characteristic that very few, perhaps none of these arguments are based on the Charter or Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This is by no means accidental. The attitude of the undeveloped countries

towards the problems of human rights which are set forth in the draft pacts is completely in accordance with the spirit and objectives of the Charter. Chapter IX of the Charter on international economic and social cooperation links the enjoyment of human rights with the creation of conditions of economic stability and social well-being, while the evolution of the non-self-governing territories and those under trusteeship towards complete political independence is one of the basic tasks to be solved if the aims of the UN Charter are to be achieved.

The attitude of the great powers and the western countries is consequently not inspired by the UN Charter, nor by a desire for the fulfilment of its aims. On the contrary, their attitude reflects the changes which have occurred during the past few years in their relationship towards UNO as a whole.

In its issue of May 17, the prominent American review „Time” declared in an article on the new American policy that radical changes in the US attitude towards colonialism had already taken place. According to this review the State Department declared last year: „It is a hard, inescapable fact that premature independence can be dangerous, retrogressive and destructive. There are areas in which there is no concept of community relationships beyond the family or tribe... regions where human beings are unable to cope with disease, famine and other forces of nature. Premature independence for these people would not serve the interests of the US nor the interests of the Free World as a whole. Least of all would it serve the interests of the dependent peoples themselves”.

The maxims of present day US policy quoted by „Time” are fundamentally different from the solemn promises made in wartime by the allied leaders to those peoples, respecting their national aspirations, independence, the creation of better living conditions, all of which assumed the form of definite obligations in the Charter. There is a diametrical difference between the US policy formulated above and the texts of the pacts. Both pacts begin with the proclamation of the right to self-determination for all peoples and nations. The right of every nation to decide freely on its political, social and economic development was included in the pacts as an indispensable prerequisite for the realisation and enjoyment of all other rights and basic freedoms. The fact that the European Council introduced its own pact on the preservation of human rights and basic freedoms on November 4, 1950, is also very characteristic where the west European countries are concerned. Although the pact is limited only to classic civic and political human rights, greater progress has been achieved than in the UN draft pacts as regards their implementation, i. e., the concrete measures which would insure the respect of the provisions laid down by the covenant. The supplementary protocol, of August 20, 1952, marks the initial step towards the extension of classic rights in the economic, social and cultural spheres. The covenant has likewise been supplemented by some cultural and ownership rights.

If considered by itself, regional cooperation in these agreements is in accordance with the UN Charter. But the refusal of the member countries to accept similar obligations within UNO is a heavy blow to this organisation, and will

have far reaching consequences. The western countries have thus created a gap between themselves and the poorer and less developed members of the international community, which is contrary to the principle of universalism on which UNO is based.

There are doubtless controversial points in the draft pacts, but their solution should be sought by mutual agreement between their supporters and opponents. Although the small and undeveloped countries constitute the majority in the UN, they wish, for the most part, to achieve compromise and realistic solutions, and to avoid protracted voting duels. It is extremely unlikely, however, that the initiation of talks on a platform of the numerous legal, philosophical and other theories and arguments which will be advanced by western diplomats in the third Committee of the General Assembly, where the pacts will be discussed, will achieve any results. The real reason for dissension over these international instruments does not lie so much in difference of theory, but in difference of attitude towards UNO. The preconditions for agreement are clearly discernible. Briefly, these preconditions are contained in a return to the policy of UNO.

The pacts on human rights could become a real instrument for the safeguarding of human rights in the international action of raising the economic and social standard and the application of the right to self-determination in the world. If, after persistent endeavours, UNO should suffer defeat in this field at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, this will be the source of yet other doubts and suspicions between those parts of the world which are still exposed to famine, disease and backwardness, and those countries which are in a privileged position today.

The contracting of agricultural products should be made regularly before the beginning of the process of production, placing both partners in definite contract relations with definite obligations. On the one hand, the industrial or commercial enterprises will supply the agricultural producers with good quality seeds of sowing material, artificial fertilizers, plant or live-stock protecting materials, fodder (if the producer buys it), and expert and technical directions telling the farmer how to organize his production, and also his obligations regarding prices and advance payments. The agricultural producer receives credit free of interest in production material and partly in cash, but on the other hand, he is under the obligation to use the materials received in his production, following the directions of the organization with which he has entered into this business relation, and to sell it a definite quantity of products at agreed prices, unless force majeure has interfered. This method of cooperation, linked with measures for the advancement of agricultural production needs, must bring about an increase and improvement of production, on the one hand, while on the other the aspect of the marketing of agricultural products will have to change, so that instead of the present central market in the area (usually a district centre) we shall see the formation of a market of agricultural products within the framework of the cooperative or the municipality, that is, the market will draw closer to the agricultural producer and, from the national and economic viewpoint, it will become cheaper, as there will be fewer losses in trading with agricultural products, while it will be possible to ensure stable prices of agricultural products, as well as stability in supplying the market and reducing the district and seasonal differences of prices, which are still quite characteristic, precisely because of the poor organisation of trading in agricultural products, and the inadequate transport network and transport facilities.

As shown above, the development of agricultural production must be linked and coordinated with a series of factors in considerably complex organizational forms. However, the system nonetheless ensures the provision of the farmer with all these services through his cooperative in the village. Hence the new cooperative has been entrusted with the principal role of concretely advancing agricultural production. The process of the transformation of the agricultural cooperative movement into an important factor of the advancement of agricultural production, is in full swing. The basic characteristic of this development is that agricultural cooperatives in the economically developed areas, such as Slovenia and some parts of Croatia, are solving the problems of the advancement of agricultural production much more successfully than in other areas. But essentially many cooperatives can be found in all the districts, which are successfully tackling the problem of hiring machines to farmers, as well as providing the services of breeding stations, repair stations and many others. So long as the cooperative as a whole, and its individual departments and plants are usefully engaged in the implementation of the measures enumerated above, enabling the farmer to find in the cooperative all the solutions to his problems, whether it is a matter of technical or economic problems, the process of the advancement of agricultural production will be all the quicker. Hence the question of the distribution of professional cadres is an important problem. The ultimate link between the agricultural producers and all the above-mentioned institutions should be the agricultural expert in the agricultural cooperative. The number of agricultural experts in our country affords the possibility of realizing such an idea, and it could be an important link between the agricultural producers on the one hand, and scientific services and institutions as well as trade and industrial enterprises on the other.

Such a link between the agricultural producers and their cooperative, and all the other factors interested in, and called upon to deal with, the problems of agricultural production, will bring about a more rapid introduction of modern measures in agricultural production.

Hence it is expected that in the next few years we shall succeed in replacing the best quality seeds of the main cultures in agriculture every fourth or fifth year; in renewing at least 30% of the vineyards and in carrying out a 50% replacement of the primitive breeds of pigs by better and more productive classes; in effecting a 30% replacement of cattle for more productive kinds, especially those giving more milk etc. Steps will also be taken to increase rapidly the use of artificial fertilizers in agricultural production, and thereby to bring about an increase of yield per surface unit and, what is especially important in our climatic conditions, to reclaim several thousand of hectares every year by irrigation of surfaces suitable for agriculture.

Such an estimation of the use of modern methods in agricultural production, and all the planned organizational, technical and economic measures should ensure an increase of production by 4—5% every year. It is clear that this increase, in view of the present structure of production, will not be equal in all cultures. With the above setting of organizational, technical and economic measures, the perspective of agriculture is favourable. The basic matter ensured by the system is the freedom of agricultural producers on the market, which they will organize in the best possible way. The agricultural producers are interested in the raising of production, income and the living standard, and this is the best guarantee for rapid progress in the development of agriculture.

PARLIAMENTARY LIFE

Milun IVANOVIĆ

Agricultural Development in Yugoslavia

In the recent period of development of Yugoslav economy, particularly of agriculture as a part of it, certain trends have become stabilized. Our country has aligned itself with the industrially developed countries. Thanks to the opening of new factories as well as to a better utilization and expansion of existing ones, industrial production has been raised by over 10% annually. The funds of agricultural production have been renewed, while exploitation in the village has been reduced to a minimum. The higher and lower agricultural schools, in order to provide technical aid to agricultural producers, have produced the necessary cadres while a number of newly-founded scientific and research institutions are benefiting agricultural producers. Every year sees a new movement of the village population into other agricultural areas. All this opens up new perspectives for the development of agricultural production.

The prospects of agricultural development are based on realistic material conditions. First of all, industry supplies agriculture with the means of production. From a backward agriculture, which used only about 4.5 kgs. of artificial fertilizers per one hectare of arable land, today we have reached the stage when about 13.5 kgs are used, that is three times as much as previously; further, while a total of 2,500 tractors or 1 tractor to 4,000 hectares of land were used, today over 10,000 tractors are in operation, that is, 1 tractor to about 1,000 hectares. A similar state of affairs prevails in the use of other agricultural machines, plant and live-stock protective substances, as well as in sowing, planting etc. This obviously shows that industrialization has already been carried out, although weight was not put on the acquisition of means for agricultural production, but was based on the exploitation of existing raw materials, and under these conditions exercised a valuable influence on the development of agriculture by way of a greater use of industrial means in agricultural production. Although, compared to the situation in other countries, the above facts indicate serious backwardness, they nonetheless show a new trend.

Means for the advancement of agriculture

The rate of advancement and raising of agricultural production under backward conditions, as it is still the case in our country, depends on what means of production the agricultural producers are offered. It is a fact that in a backward agriculture it is not always possible, especially at first, to reckon only with the profit derived from individual means of production, and that this factor cannot be taken as the sole factor. In order to stimulate the use of the modern means for agricultural production, the Yugoslav Government introduced in 1952 the system of subsidizing the use of industrial means of production, that is, the sale of agricultural machines, artificial fertilizers, plant-protecting substances, fuel and lubricants — at much lower prices than were quoted for imported and domestic products. The policy gave good result and this period is decisive in the utilization of these materials. This means that it is impossible to make rapid progress in the advancement of a backward sphere of activity, such as agriculture, without com-

munal investment. The National Assembly, by subsidizing the purchase of supplies for agricultural production also makes investments in the way of creating habits among agricultural producers to increase production, and their income, at the same time creating customers, not only for processing materials but also for consumer goods. In 1952 about 5.5 milliard dinars were expended for this purpose, while in 1953 this sum was increased to about 14 milliard. The next few years will doubtless see further increases in this regard, as a result of increased requirements and use of modern methods in our villages. In giving subsidies no discrimination is made between the various categories of producers, so that the supplies are equally available at low prices to big farms, cooperatives, agricultural institutions and private producers. The use of these supplies depends solely on the degree of development of individual agricultural producers.

The relation of prices

Another important factor is the relation between prices of agricultural and industrial products. In principle, the market of agricultural products is quite free. Every agricultural productive organization and every agricultural producer, as well as every consumer of agricultural products, may sell and buy on the market at freely formed prices. In this respect too, no restrictions exist for any category of producers or consumers.

However, the State intervenes in imposing restricted prices of some agricultural and food products, e.g. flour, oil, lard and sugar. The State directly fixes the highest buy-up prices for grains, fattened pigs and oil-yielding plants, which must be observed by the trade organizations that deal in these products, and limits the possibilities for the buy-up of certain products which serve as raw material for the food industry, for instance sugar beet, tobacco and similar products. This State intervention in the forming of prices of agricultural products is fully justified. On the one hand it protects the producers in the main buy-up seasons, when the bulk of agricultural producers offer their products on the market, that is, it has the character of protective prices — and on the other when these products are sold outside the season, it limits the possibilities for speculation in these agricultural products, as in that case all consumers get their supplies through the commercial network. In this way the prices of basic food articles are stabilized on the market.

If we take the price level in 1938 as 100, then the index of prices of agricultural products in 1953/4 is — 1,426, while the index of prices of industrial products with services is 1,202, which shows that the agricultural producers are better off on the market by about 16% compared to before the war. The relation thus created in the exchange has its effect also on the supply of the market with agricultural products, and on increased interest of agricultural producers in bringing goods on the market.

There is no doubt, in view of the above mentioned trends, that the relation between prices of industrial pro-

ducts and those of food products will turn in favour of food products. Such trends will help the advancement of agricultural production and ensure a rapid increase of production in agriculture, on the basis of experiences which have been gained in the developed countries, through the application of science and technics.

Crediting of agriculture

The third important moment is the problem of crediting agriculture. Although the relation between the prices of industrial goods and agricultural products has improved as a whole, and the purchasing power of the village has considerably grown, it cannot be said that this is sufficient for a rapid advancement of agricultural production, and that the purchasing power of the village can ensure such investments and increases in the use of processing materials as will lead to a rapid rise in agricultural production, and free the country from the need of importing grains and lard on the one hand; and on the other strengthen the participation of agricultural and food articles in export, and lead to the solution of the problems of the payment balance.

In order to ensure a favourable movement in this direction, a system of crediting all categories of agricultural producers was introduced this year. Practically, the agricultural producing organizations were treated just as other producing organizations, both in the administrative period and in the period of change-over to the new system. Thus in the previous system too, the farms and cooperatives were guaranteed a credit for revolving assets, while investments were financed from the budget or credits.

In the new economic system, in addition to the fact that the financing of investments is conducted on credit with all producing organizations, steps have been taken for extending crediting for investments, and for private agricultural producers. Up to this year private producers were in a position to get credit only by way of an advance paid by industrial enterprises for contracting agricultural raw materials. Now, however, besides the widening of the system of contracting, a system of the direct granting of credits to agricultural producers has been introduced, through the bank, or through agricultural cooperatives.

This year, sums planned in the Federation funds for investment in agriculture amount to 14,5 milliard dinars. Indications are that these means will be gradually increased, so as to reach, together with the means of agricultural producers, the total investments of about 50 milliard dinars annually. This policy of the constant increase of credits, along with sufficient quantities of investment material on the market for the village, and with the policy of low prices of the investment and processing materials for agriculture, will ensure the interest of agricultural producers in the investment and use of these means.

The income tax system as a stimulator in production

Finally, the income tax system is one of the most important economic measures capable of stimulating agricultural production. This year we have tackled the problem of levying taxes from agricultural producers. Although the taxing of income essentially remained as it was, objective standards were discovered for ascertaining income and equalizing all agricultural producers, putting them on the same level as regards conditions of production. The essence of the new taxation system lies in the fact that standards were objectivized on the basis of cadastre surfaces, and the quality of various categories of land, in establishing the average income for the area of an administrative unit. Thus the income which serves for apportioning tax is automatically calculated on the basis of average incomes prescribed in advance, regardless of what the agricultural producer actually achieves in production. In other words, with an equal surface of the same basic culture and the same quality of land, every producer in one administrative unit has the same social obligations. Thus if anybody realizes a larger than average income, he remains untaxed on the surplus, and if he realizes an income below the average he will pay income tax on the average, that is he will practically pay an economic penalty for his backwardness.

All the aforesaid measures are chiefly intended to solve the problem of economic relations, opening perspectives for the agricultural producer and encouraging him to invest more and intensify agricultural production, the aim being specialization in agricultural production and increase of the exchange of goods. However, if we stopped at these measures, and if we failed to take a number of technical measures, organizing a service of technical aid for agricultural producers, the advancement of agricultural production would not be as efficacious and rapid as is possible to achieve under present conditions.

Importance of scientific and research institutions and services

The scientific-research institutions in farming, fruit-growing, wine-growing, stock-rearing and other branches of agricultural production have already yielded important results, whether in the evolution of their own material, or in verifying the behaviour of foreign varieties and their selection under our conditions. The very fact that we can anticipate the results of our own materials shows that we cannot make big professional and hence also economic mistakes. The problem is, therefore, how to transfer the achievements and experiences of our scientific institution to broad practice in production. In this field the work of our scientific institutions is not satisfactory. However, during the last two years, and especially this year, serious attempts have been made to apply the achievements of these institutions in practical work. Of course these institutions have found their real path by linking up with the big agricultural producers. However, the prospect is that these institutions will have to open special departments for consultations with experts in the field, concerning the way in which scientific achievements should be easily and quickly applied under our conditions on a large scale.

It is beyond doubt that an early development of this service will produce excellent results, and that producers should be supplied as soon as possible with more productive materials for agricultural production than they now have at their disposal. Hence plans have been made for the creation of funds for the advancement of agricultural production in the districts, the republics, and in the Federation framework, which will be primarily used for the development of these institutions, and for prizes to those who have scored successes in agricultural production; in other words — which will speed up the development of the bases for the raising of productivity in agriculture. These funds will begin to function partially this year while next year will become a component part of the instruments of the Social Plan (Plan of General Development).

As will be seen from the above, the development of modern technical measures in agricultural production is to be pursued through the participation of all factors: the interest and care of the district assembly and the district council of producers, agricultural institutions and producer organizations, as well as agricultural cooperatives.

However, all these factors could not be fully successful unless they consciously influenced trade in agricultural products. In view of the level of technical equipment, the organization of agricultural production, transport possibilities etc, we are not in a position today to organize the marketing of agricultural products as it is organized in the developed countries. But in any case, we must influence the marketing of agricultural products and gradually dissuade the producers from bringing out on the market small quantities of their products. This will result in the expansion of the system of contracting in agricultural products.

ART AND CRITICISM

Marko RISTIĆ


Summer Performances at Dubrovnik

THE true artistic worth of the Summer Performances at Dubrovnik has not yet, in my opinion, been fully realized, either in their most successful manifestation or in some effective details of the less successful manifestations, and not even is their value as a whole, both as conception and achievement, quite understood. First of all, the setting in which they take place or rather the manner in which this setting has been made use of, gives them a unique value. One can say that Dubrovnik itself greatly contributes to the beauty of this festival as a whole, but one can also say that the Summer Performances enhance the beauty of Dubrovnik. By reviving it, the Summer Performances intensify the beauty of Dubrovnik, give it a new aspect, a new value, a new meaning. I do not mean that without them the beauty of Dubrovnik is dead. But all beauty is mortal — the beauty of a city, as well as the beauty of a woman, a landscape or a poem, or of any work of art. This is not only because, like everything else, it is ephemeral and subject to time, as all that comes into being and passes, excepting existence itself. Beauty is mortal, when alive, because it is alive, because it lives only as long as it is experienced by man, and only when experiencing beauty does man enliven it. The Summer Performances are a new form of experiencing the beauty of Dubrovnik, mellowed through the centuries, they are an evocation of its past cultural wealth, an intermingling of the past and the creative present.

To make a great multiple stage of Dubrovnik, without spoiling the authenticity and dignity of the historic significance and architecture of this unique city, is undoubtedly a bold and delicate enterprise upon whose success or failure depends the success or failure of the Summer Performances. But it has been proved that the possibilities are diverse and abundant, and that they have been used with a feeling for harmony and the unity of the performance and the place. In each performance (concert or play) a new expression was found both for the beauty of the work and the beauty of the place where it is performed. The natural setting, well chosen, enhances the value of the work, the old décor inspires it with new life. On a summer night, the atrium of Prince's Palace, Bošković's piazza, the cathedral square, the atrium of the Sponza Mansion — these are the concert halls of the Dubrovnik Festival, open to the starlit firmament, ideal for the music not only of the old Dubrovnik composers, Sorkočević, Jarmović and Rogowski, but also for Verdi's Requiem, for the music of Mozart and Beethoven, Papandopolo and Honegger. And how suitable is the natural setting for the plays of Držić and Shakespeare, Goethe and Ivo Vojnović, for the drama or comedy shown on these open-air stages are not stages. They are not, indeed, stages in the ordinary sense of the word, and yet they are more fitting than any other stage, for they are predestinated just for the scenes that are displayed, just for the actions that are enacted, just for the words to which we listen. These are places that were and are lived in, round which hover historical and cultural associations that constitute a part of their beauty, and unchanged, they have been transformed into artistic scenery, and so by this interaction of past and future, in this intermingling of fiction and

reality they are dedicated to their original purpose. And, vice versa, plays that are performed in these places seem as if they are intended to be shown on this natural stage.

It is quite understandable that this is important to the Dubrovnik playwrights, but on the other hand one of the facts that gives a special value to the Dubrovnik Summer Performances is that this applies to other playwrights too. What is more natural than to perform *Robinja* (Slave Girl) — a drama in three acts written by a man from Hvar, Hanibal Lucić, in celebration of Dubrovnik? The action of the play takes place at Dubrovnik and it is performed (under the direction of Dr. Branko Gavela), in front



Gradac Park in Dubrovnik

of the Prince's Palace, in the authentic Dubrovnik décor, unchanged for centuries. What is more natural than to perform Držić's *Novela od Stanca* — (Comedy of Stanac) — (in which Dr. Marko Fotez inserted the pastoral *Tirena*) in front of Sponza's Mansion and Onufrije's fountain, just where Držić imagined his carnival play taking place? Marin Držić himself, that gay and witty realist who died when Shakespeare was only three, the plebeian who amused the aristocrats of Dubrovnik with his jokes, who knew how to make them laugh and how to laugh at them. He suppressed the fashion set by Plato and the conventional Renaissance and Siena models, and created in his comedies a whole series of vivid personalities speaking the vernacular and so vividly depicted Dubrovnik of the 16th century. This comic writer who ended as a rebel, conspirator and emigrant, Držić, this gifted plebeian, would have been glad to see his *Novela od Stanca* performed on a street of Dubrovnik, right in front of Onufrije's fountain, which he used to know, just as it is now, and in the same place. He would have been glad to see that all this is still alive, that the merry comedy is enacted where he wanted

it to take place and that it makes people laugh to-day as it did four hundred years ago. But the aristocratic oligarchy is no more...

It is also clear that Držić's poetical pastoral comedy, *Plakir* has found an ideal background, an ideal stage in the Gradac Park, in this sweet Mediterranean grove, for how could Držić, writing *Plakir* at Dubrovnik, imagine otherwise the Arcadia where his pastoral takes place? *Plakir* performed at Dubrovnik for the first time in 1550, fourteen years before Shakespeare was born, is without doubt similar, to some extent, to a *Midsummer's Night Dream*, which appeared on the stage forty five years after *Plakir*. Both plays are about love and its divine irrationality, about a medley of dream and reality that make life so human, about the parallelism of the visible and invisible world about mingling poetry and force, about the coexistence of mythological and real beings, about popular figures. And it is quite natural after *Plakir* to perform the *Midsummer's Night Dream* which found in Gradac, as probably nowhere else, a milieu that is suitable to the poetry of this merry, light and sagacious nocturne by Shakespeare. To hear it and see drama unroll and its verses cascade among the pines, in the perfumed grove, upon the gentle slope under the Milky Way and a myriad stars, is to live through a magic dream about love, full of illusions, longing and laughter. But this is not the only setting found in Dubrovnik for Shakespeare's genius.

Another natural stage is the old fortress of Lovrijenac. The choice of Lovrijenac for the presentation of Hamlet is another example of the endeavour — contrary to the performing of Držić's *Novela od Stanca* in front of Onufrije's fountain, and Vojnović's drama *Na taraci* on the terrace of the villa of Gundulić family, where the writer imagined the action had taken place — to transform a real place, whose reality remains unchanged, into another place, to make them appear the same. Lovrijenac has become Elsinor, and yet it is still Lovrijenac. So some evident shortcomings of this performance are of no consequence: the basic conception of the director, Marko Fotez, and the unaffected manly acting of Veljko Mărićić are in harmony with the austerity of the old walls, of the terraces raised high upon the sky, of this „high place”, and the spectator

really can, with deep feeling and with new excitement, relive and confirm as immortal the drama of Hamlet's mind in all its lucidity, bitterness and tragedy.

After seeing Goethe's *Iphigenia upon Taurid*, under the direction of Branko Gavela, performed after a *Midsummer's Night Dream* at the same place in Gradac Park, we are best aware of what it means to feel and use skilfully all the possibilities offered by such a place, for the realization of various scenic effects. Yet it is no longer the same place, for its character has been so much altered by simple means, by a subtle change of the viewing angle and of the lighting that it is now adapted to the classical and pure lines of this dramatic poem. And in itself this performance of Iphigenia is a great achievement of masterly direction and acting. There is no doubt that it is more difficult to revive Goethe's words than Shakespeare's for the modern audience may be unmoved by Goethe's words, and if such is the case these words will not live. However, this summer, at Dubrovnik, they were always alive, for they moved the audience at every performance of Iphigenia in Gradac. The credit for this goes to Gavela's sure hand, the hand of a great master of the theatre; the credit goes to Tonko Lonze for his fine acting in the role of Orest, which was so faithfully rendered by Goethe himself at Weimar: due to Marija Crnobori, a very great artist, who recited verse as one who deeply feels the value of each word, the music and sense of the poetical phrase, an artist who, in the proper sense of the word creates her role anew at every performance giving personality, movement and speech with unforgettable inspiration and precision.

These are merely a few details, but the point is, as it should be, the whole. Music, poetry and paintings (for during the Summer Performances modern Yugoslav paintings are exhibited every year) are made congruous with a city that itself speaks a language of art, culture and harmony, combined with natural beauty, a language that finds an echo in every one who is not devoid of a sense for the riches with which man adorns the world and of associations that give beauty and worth to life. These associations, reminiscences and hopes make the Summer Performances a rich and precious experience.

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
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